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HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS
AND RESERVATIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF A
CRITICAL DEFICIT IN THE CEDAW
Michael L. Buenger*

Human rights agreements like the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) contain language that seeks to inspire and establish the legal boundaries
of state action with regards to protected rights. Such agreements also
contain reservation provisions that enable states to join an agreement
and simultaneously exempt themselves from the very substantive
goals the agreement seeks to achieve. In the past, the issue of reservation compatibility has been treated as political questions under an objection process. Establishing a mechanism for testing reservation
compatibility before the International Court of Justice is a better
means of ensuring that states do not nonchalantly exempt themselves
from human rights obligations through reservations.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Like the American Declaration of Independence' or the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 2 human rights agreements can embody language that seeks to inspire as much as to achieve a political, social,
or legal objective.3 As such, they have the capacity to establish the parameters of dialogue, promote agreed to principles, motivate a policy debate, and
provide, in some instances, enhanced protection for certain fundamental
rights. In their inspirational capacity they can serve the quintessential function of setting the "tone" of a dialogue, a factor that can be as important as
* LLM in Public International Law, with Distinction, University of Kent, Brussels
School of International Studies (2012); JD cum laude, St. Louis University School of

Law (1989). I would like to thank Dr. Yutaka Arai of the University of Kent for his
helpful comments.

1. THE DECLARATION
self-evident").

OF INDEPENDENCE

(U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be

2. THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN (France 1793)
("[B]elieving that the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole
cause of public calamities and of the corruption of governments, have determined to set

forth in a solemn declaration the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man").
3. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A.
Res. 217 (111) A, U.N. Doc AIRES/217( 111) ("Whereas recognition of the inherent
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is

the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world").
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establishing the basis for future legal action. For example, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination4
(ICERD) is credited with spurring nations to address racial discrimination
by articulating principles that establish a new "base-line" for tolerance. 5 Yet
the very aspects of human rights conventions that spur needed debate and
action - the articulation of broadly accepted human rights principles - can
also form their Achilles heel. The utter absence of a legitimized, practicable
and uniformly enforceable legal regime acceptable to states can render a
convention little more than a tonal achievement; one that is highly inspirational but does not necessarily offer the broad, tangible protections that
their authors may have hoped would be the end result. Reservations to
human rights agreements present a particularly thorny obstacle in developing effective legal regimes. If a human rights agreement is subject to such
qualification and reservation as to render its substantive provisions a nullity
in many signatory states, not only is the genuineness of a particular agreement drawn into question but so too is the international community's efforts
to protect human rights and promote the rule of law as the countervailing
force against egregious misconduct.
This article is divided into three parts. Part I will briefly explore the
linkage between the status of states, state reservations, and modern human
rights agreements. CEDAW 6 is not alone in allowing nations to make reservations to "universal" human rights agreements. 7 Utilizing CEDAW as a
case study, Part II will examine whether state reservations to key provisions
in human rights agreements effectively negate the very objectives of the
agreement. Not all reservations are created equal. Those that exempt a signatory state from complying with substantively important provisions are of
4. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD].
5. But see, Claire Breen, The Policy of Direct Provision in Ireland:A Violation of
Asylum Seekers' Right to an Adequate Standardof Housing, 20(4) INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
611 (2008) (noting that Ireland's failure to incorporate international obligations into
domestic law means such agreements have limited effect).
6. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
7. Examples of implied reservations are found with regards to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. Examples of explicit reservations are found with
regards to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 51, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, art. 91, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93; Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 46, May 3, 2008, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
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particular concern.8 Finally, Part III concludes by examining how reservations to human rights accords might be better addressed by replacing unenforceable statements of "incompatibility" with a process for assessing the
degree to which a reservation conflicts with the objective of an agreement.
Absent verification of compatibility with the objectives of a human rights
agreement, reservations can actually encourage states to subtly disavow
their substantive obligations while enjoying the political benefits of being
seen as a member of the "club." Such arrangements, far from promoting
human rights, relieve states of their obligations to pursue political, social
and economic reforms, thus undermining faith in human rights agreements
generally and long-term progress towards ameliorating widespread
mistreatment.

II.
A.

HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS AND RESERVATIONS

The Choice-accountabilityProblem and Treaties

As international accords, human rights agreements are susceptible not
only to broad language problems but to the fact that their primary actors nation-states (hereinafter "states") - enjoy a status that makes enforceability
difficult under the best of circumstances. 9 Unlike the European Convention
on Human Rights and its relatively powerful rights vindication process,10

most human rights agreements do not come packaged with powerful enforcement mechanisms. The primary model of enforcement is the use of
transparency methodologies as evidenced in state reporting systems," individual complaints processes,12 and international reports. 3 Often, subsequent
8. See discussion, infra Part II.B.
9. See J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF

58 (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963); H.
576 (2d ed. 1966); Ted L. McDorman,
Reservations and the Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 481, 505 (1982)
(all discussing the fact that states must agree to be bound).
10. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
NATIONS

KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

art. 19, Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222., as amended; See also, Jean-Paul Costa, On
the Legitimacy of the European Courtof Human Rights' Judgments, 7(2)
L. REV. 172 (2011).

EUR. CONST.

11. See generally Annemarie Devereux & Catherine Anderson, Reporting under
InternationalHuman Rights Treaties: Perspectivesfrom Timor Leste's Experience of
the Reformed Process, 8(2) HUM. RTS. L. REV. 69 (2008).

12. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 1, Mar, 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Optional Protocol to the

ICCPR]; see also, Optional Protocol to the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter Optional Protocol to the

ICESCR].
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efforts to improve enforcement have been met with mixed results given the
inherent weaknesses underlying a voluntary compliance system.14 The lack
of powerful enforcement mechanisms in human rights agreements like
CEDAW15 reflects not only sensitivity to widely varying cultural norms and
internal power-politics, but perhaps as significantly the very status we assign to the notion of sovereign states within the international system. The
state does not exist in a theoretical vacuum unconnected to the social, cultural and political fabric upon which it rests.16 To assume that states are
merely political entities lacking a social or cultural context is to ignore the
diversity of humanity.
While cultural differences may explain varying attitudes to human
rights, it is the status of states as imbued with "sovereign equality" that
explains the political consequences of these differences. States, unlike their
political subdivisions or individual citizens, have the advantage of two
countervailing characteristics: they are imbued with high decisional discretion' 7 and low accountability for how they exercise that discretion.' This
13. See, e.g., Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, 46th Sess., July 12-30, 2010, 47th Sess., Oct. 4-22, 2010, 48th Sess., Jan. 17 Feb. 4, 2011, U.N Doc. A/66/38; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (2010).
14. See Kerry Boyne, UN Women: Jumping the Hurdles to Overcoming Gender
Inequality, or FallingShort Of Expectations?, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 683 (2011)

(discussing weaknesses in the CEDAW Optional Protocol); see also Marsha L. Hackenberg, Can the OptionalProtocolfor the Convention on the Rights of the Child Protect
the Ugandan Child Soldier?, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 417 (2000); Shara Abraham, Child Soldiers and the Capacity of the Optional Protocol to Protect Children in
Conflict, 10 Hum. RTs. BRIEF 15 (Spring 2003).
15. See Karen E. Bravo, Exploring The Analogy Between Modern Trafficking In
Humans And The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT'L L.J. 207 (2007) (asserting

that CEDAW has the weakest of all human rights enforcement regimes); See also
David A. Balton, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Prospectsfor Interna-

tional Enforcement, 12 Hum. RTS. Q. 120, 128 (1990) (noting that the implementation
mechanism in the CRC does not establish any concrete means of enforcement at the
international level).
16. See, e.g., Roger O'Keefe, The "Right To Take Part In CulturalLife" Under
Article 15 of the ICESCR, 47(4) INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 904 (1998) (noting that Interna-

tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights imposes on states the obligation to take affirmative steps to promote and protect the right of linguistic, ethnic and
religious minorities within states, as well as whole national and pluralistic cultures of
states, to practise and develop their distinctive identities).
17. See, e.g., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28) [hereinafter cited as
Genocide Advisory Opinion] ("It is well established that in its treaty relations a State
cannot be bound without its consent, and that consequently no reservation can be effective against any State without its agreement thereto").
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holds true whether we examine choice-accountability issues on a domestic
or international scale. For example, domestically a state may claim "sovereign immunity" to insulate it from official wrong-doings' 9 or, in authoritarian regimes, use sheer power politics to avoid responsibility for various
actions. 20Thus, states possess wide latitude regarding the nature of their legal regimes, the degree of interpretative freedom they deploy, and the manner and forms of their legal and political culpability. 2 1
Choice-accountability issues are amplified in the international arena
given the relative lack of democratic or institutional systems of multilateral
accountability. Authoritatively, human rights are often cast as supra-national objectives enjoying an independent basis beyond conventional and
customary state obligations. 2 2 In practice, however, the protection and implementation of human rights is distinctly state-centric in which "the state"
remains, even today, the pivotal actor. States are not obligated to adopt
human rights agreements, 2 3 may ex post "opt-out" of agreements, 24 may "re18. See, e.g., Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. rights body condemns Syria over violations, REUTERS, Mar. 1, 2012, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/uksyria-rights-idUKTRE8200I220120301; See also Cedric Ryngaert, The European Court
Of Human Rights' Approach To The Responsibility Of Member States In Connection
With Acts Of InternationalOrganizations, 60(4) INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 997 (2011).
19. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012); 1994
art. 88 (BeIg.) ("The King's person is inviolable").

CONST.,

20. See, e.g., Kai Ambos, The Fujimori Judgment: A President's Responsibility
for Crimesagainst Humanity as Indirect PerpetratorBy Virtue Of an OrganisedPower
Apparatus,9(l) J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 137 (2011); See also Nuno Garoupa & Maria A.
Maldonado, The JudiciaryIn PoliticalTransitions:The CriticalRole Of U.S. Constitutionalism In Latin America, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 593, 606 (2011) (noting

that "In authoritarian regimes political crimes, human rights violations, police activity
regulation, and all acts that potentially threaten the regime may be allocated to a new
system of political courts that will smoothly implement the wishes and goals of the
regime").
21. See, e.g., Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel, U. S. Dep't of Justice,
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002).
22. See, e.g., South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J. 248, 296 (May 20) (Tanaka, J.
dissenting) ("States which do not recognize this principle or even deny its validity are
nevertheless subject to its rule ... its validity extended beyond the will of States . . into

the sphere of natural law and assume an aspect of its supra -national and supra -positive
character").
23. See generally Case of S.S. Wimbledon, Judgment, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. I
(Aug. 17) (establishing the principle that the right to enter into international engagements is an act of state sovereignty).
24. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, art. 19, Oct. 6, 1999, 1248 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
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interpret" agreements, 25 or may make reservations to agreements that elevate domestic political needs over universal protections, all without much
fear of profound consequence. Accordingly, while human rights can be cast
in a distinctively monolithic construct of highest norms, in actuality the
implementation and protection of human rights is a distinctively multifarious exercise almost always dependent on states exercising their significant
and often unilateral discretion, 26 a fact that makes compliance vulnerable to
internal theologies, philosophies, and power politics. 27 A state that is politically and economically powerful or whose leaders do not have to contend
with an internally strong civil society enjoys a wide-range of choices with
regard to its various legal regimes commingled with thin accountability
constraints. Thus, states operate with the capability of manipulating the
choice-accountability equation with relative impunity oftentimes driven
more by the domestic needs of the state than any sense of responsibility to
the larger international community and its core human rights principles. 28
Such is the case with CEDAW. While CEDAW seeks to promote gender
equality by globalizing certain "universal" principles that are to guide the
internal policies of states, in practice many states have made reservations to
CEDAW that effectively render their commitments more symbolic than
substantive.

CEDAW Optional Protocol] ("Any State Party may denounce the present Protocol at
any time by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations").
25. Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming InternationalLaw from Extraterritoriality,93
L. REV. 815 (2009) (noting that the U.S. reinterprets international conventions to
protect its sovereignty).
26. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin & Jane Gordon, The U.K. CEDA W Story, 3 EUR.

MINN.

Hum. RTs. L. REV. 274-293 (2011) (observing that implementation of CEDAW in the

UK is linked to the country's self-perception of its place in the international legal order
and its contested relationship with Europe).
27. See, e.g., Colum Lynch, Serbia arrests Ratko Mladic on war crimes charges,
WASH.

POST,

May 26, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/serbia-arrests-

ratko-mladic-on-war-crimes-charges/2011/05/26/AGXIDIBH-story.html

(noting that

Mladic was able to hide in Serbia for almost 16 years before being arrested);
Abdelmoneim Abu Edris Ali, Sudan's Bashir, Ministerdance after ICC Warrant, GULF

Mar. 4, 2012, http://www.gulftimes.comisite/topics/article.asp?cu-no=2&item
no-490336&version=1 &templatejid=37&parent id= 17.
TIMES,

28. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the
Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 251, 251-52, no. 9 (2010) (observing that the

Bush administration was able to reinterpret Geneva Convention requirements because
of public demand to fight terrorism).
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Reservations

Reservations are a relatively new development in modern treaty-making. Prior to the late 19th century, the process of constructing a treaty was
rather linear and uncompromising, framed by the notion that unanimity,
uniformity and full consent were key elements to legitimacy and enforceability. 29 Crucial aspects of a treaty were negotiated and, once agreed to, ex
post departures from the regime were doubtful.30 A state objecting to a particular treaty provision had the choice to either accept the treaty as written
(even over its own objections) or refuse to join the agreement. This approach preserved the core principles of uniformity and unanimity, and at
least in theory laid a footing for an effective compliance regime. 3 1 In the
late- 19th and throughout the 20th century, however, this approach to treatymaking crumbled. 32 In place of uniformity, the notion of gradations of
treaty rights emerged as evidenced in the "Pan-American Rule" that recognized the possibility of differentiated obligations between signatory states. 33
The Pan-American Rule formally legitimized the principle of "reservation"
and the fact that a reserving state could become a party to a treaty even if
other states objected to the reservation. 34

29. See IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ed. 1984); SHABTAi ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE

(2d.
1945-1986
(1989); MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW & TREATIES 259-278
(1985); Special Rapporteur on Reservations to Treaties, Second Report on Reservations
to Treaties, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/477 (June 13, 1996) (by Alain
Pellet).
30. See, e.g., Genocide Advisory Opinion, supra note 17, at 21 ("To this principle
was linked the notion of the integrity of the convention as adopted, a notion which in its
traditional concept involved the proposition that no reservation was valid unless it was
accepted by all the contracting parties without exception, as would have been the case if
it had been stated during the negotiations").
31. See Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 307, 313 (2006).
32. See, e.g., Genocide Advisory Opinion, supra note 17, at 25.
33. See Catherine Logan Piper, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties:The Goalof
Universality,71 IOWA L. REV. 295, 308 (1985); See also Andres E. Montalvo, Reservations to the American Convention on Human Rights: A New Approach, 16 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 269, 274-75 (2001); see also Genocide Advisory Opinion, supra note 17, at 21
(noting that although conventions are in the nature of a contract, a more flexible approach to treaty obligations may be warranted where increasing membership is
desirable).
34. See Robert P. Marshall, The Problem of Reservationsin MultilateralConventions, 30 ALB. L. REV. 100, 104 (1966).
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
LAW OF TREATIES,
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As a general principle, states are bound to adhere to their treaty obligations in accordance with the fundamental norm of pacta sunt servanda.35 A
state is obligated not to invoke its domestic law as an excuse for non-compliance with its obligations. 36 Thus, the use of reservations in modern multilateral agreements reveals a critical contradiction with respect to modern
treaty making: (1) treaties are intended to create a uniform and binding
legal regime between the signatory states;37 and yet (2) Article 19 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention") institutionalized the Pan-American Rule by recognizing the principle of reservations as a means of accommodating peculiar state interests at the expense of
uniformity. 3 8 As Edward T. Swaine has observed, reservations have the
effect of "turning a prixfixe menu ii la carte."39 The right to make a reservation is only constrained by three considerations: (1) a treaty explicitly
prohibits reservations; 40 (2) a treaty limits reservations to specific matters; 4 1
or (3) a reservation is "incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty." 42 While the first two considerations concerning the validity of reservations rest on clear standards, the third consideration is more problematic given the utter lack of standards to measure the lawfulness of a
reservation. 43 Consequently, whether a reservation is "incompatible" is cur35. See Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith").
36. Id. at art. 27 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article
46"); See also Tunis and Morocco Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. Rep, (ser. B) No. 4
(Feb. 7), at 24 (a state's discretion with respect to its domestic authority may be limited
by obligations undertaken vis-A-vis other states).
37. See Genocide Advisory Opinion, supra note 17, at 21 ("a multilateral convention is the result of an agreement freely concluded upon its clauses and that consequently none of the contracting parties is entitled to frustrate or impair, by means of
unilateral decisions or particular agreements, the purpose and raison d'itre of the
convention").
38. See generally Francesco Parisi & Catherine S?evc?enko, Treaty Reservations
and the Economics ofArticle 21(1) of the Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
1 (2003); See also Eric Neumayer, Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to
International Human Rights Treaties, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (2007).

39. Swaine, supra note 31, at 307.
40. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, at art. 19(a).
41. Id. at art. 19(b).
42. Id. at art. 19(c).
43. See Genocide Advisory opinion, supra note 17, at 24 (Guerrero, J. dissenting)
("What is the 'object and purpose' of the Genocide Convention? To repress genocide?
Of course; but is it more than that? Does it comprise any or all of the enforcement
articles of the Convention? That is the heart of the matter").
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rently more a political question than legal question, particularly given the
status we have assigned to the state, even though a treaty is a legal
instrument.
The right to make a reservation can be implied from the status of
states" or specifically authorized in the text of an agreement by either positive or negative reference. 4 5 Once made, a reservation effectively becomes a
reciprocal obligation in the negative; that is, as between a reserving state
and an objecting state that part of the treaty impacted by the reservation is
not in force. Consequently, the legal effect of making a reservation is not
simply to relieve a state of its domestic obligation to conform its laws to the
terms of the treaty, it is to relieve other signatory states of the obligation to
comply with a provision as between the two states that is otherwise operable between all non-objecting states. Moreover, while an objection to a reservation may render it inoperable between the two signatory states, silence
as to a reservation by other signatory states arguably effectively legitimizes
the reservation. This creates an odd situation in which a reservation that
may be viewed as illegitimate and incompatible by some signatory states is
viewed as perfectly legitimate and compatible by other member states. This
contradiction is particularly problematic in the human rights arena where
the relative universality and superiority of human rights as to all other interests is undercut by reservations that are themselves seen as legitimate by
signatory states that think likewise about the distinctly "non-universal" or
even subordinate nature of the rights being protected by an agreement. If,
for example, a state makes a reservation to a substantive provision of a
genocide or torture or antidiscrimination convention that is not repudiated
by all other signatory states, arguably the protections offered by such conventions are not only differentiated between the signatory states, they are
diminished for all people otherwise to be protected by the convention because the principle of universality and superiority is substantially undercut.
The use of reservations is a calculated risk, subject undoubtedly to a
cost-benefit analysis: if a reserving state is more concerned with the domes44. See Genocide Advisory Opinion, supra note 17, at 22 ("It could certainly not
be inferred from the absence of an article providing for reservations . . . that the contracting States are prohibited from making certain reservations"); See, e.g., Venezuela

Reservation to the ICCPR, art. 14 (3)(d), http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec

(follow the

link

to

"Venezuela"); Sweden Reservation to the ICCPR, arts. 10(3), 14(7), 20(1). http://treat
ies.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=
en#EndDec (follow the link to "Sweden").
45. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of Children, art. 51(1) & (2), Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (Secretary General shall receive reservations; reservation may
not be incompatible with objectives of the convention).
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tic impact of an agreement and less concerned about reciprocal non-compliance, it is more apt to make a reservation. The converse is equally true: the
less impact an agreement will have on important domestic interests, the less
likely it is that a state will make a reservation to substantive provisions even
if permitted to do so. Because provisions impacting human rights can present a distinct challenge to the cultural fabric of a society, states appear to
demand much greater leniency or a "higher premium" in implementation
and enforceability than is demanded in, for example, a bilateral investment
treaty.46 More importantly, because human rights agreements can present
high domestic costs, states are much more likely to demand a higher premium in the form of the right to make reservations as reciprocity for joining
a "universal" accord, effectively demanding much higher discretion when it
comes to compliance than might otherwise be allowed in other contexts.
The Vienna Convention's rules governing reservations make no distinctions as to particular categories of treaties; reservations made to a
human rights agreement are not considered legally more distinctive than
those made to a trade agreement notwithstanding the super-normative
weight supposedly assigned to human rights. 47 Reservations seek to accommodate peculiar state interests and as such can be placed in two broad categories. First, many reservations may be defined as technical, 4 8 including
procedural 49 or jurisdictional reservations. 50 Others are narrowly substantive
46. Compare Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 530 (2008) (provisions in convention mandating a foreign national be given access to his consulate's not self-executing
and therefore not a bar to imposition of death penalty) with Loewen Group, Inc. v.
United States. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3. 42 I.L.M. 811 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. 2003) (court decisions may give rise to individual NAFTA claims under the agreement's definition of "law" and "measure").
47. See Vienna Convention, supra note 35, at art. 21; See also Konstantin Korkelia, New challenges to the regime of reservationsunder the InternationalCovenant on
Civil and PoliticalRights, 13(2) EUR. J. INT'L L. 437 (2002).

48. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Reservation of Denmark to Art. 24, 26 & 39, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I. A.S. No.
11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention] ("[T]he Kingdom of Denmark objects to the use of French in any application, communication or other document
sent to its Central Authority").
49. See, e.g., Hague Convention, supra note 48, Reservation of Israel to Art. 26
("Israel hereby declares that, in proceedings under the Convention, it shall not be bound
to assume any costs resulting from the participation of legal counsel or advisers or from
court proceedings, except insofar as those costs may be covered by its system of legal
aid and advice").
50. See, e.g., Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition,
Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for
the Protection of Children, Reservation of Switzerland to Art. 55, Oct. 19, 1996, 35
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in nature, in effect exempting a state from compliance with a narrow provision in an agreement. Such reservations may prove highly inconvenient in
particular circumstances or for particular individuals, but they do not relieve
the state of its broad substantive obligations stated in the convention.
The second category of reservations carves out broadly substantive exceptions to an agreement. Such reservations, found with regard to numerous
human rights agreements, can effectively exempt a state from complying
with a fundamental or core objective of an agreement. For example, numerous states have made reservations to Article IX of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide Convention").5 ' These reservations either (1) reject the jurisdiction of the ICJ52 or
(2) qualify its jurisdiction by a consent-to-suit requirement. 53 By making a
reservation to Article IX, a state effectively insulates itself from the nucleus
of the convention's accountability regime. States have rejected such reservations holding that, "In [the view of Norway], reservations in respect of
Article IX of the Convention are incompatible with the object and purpose
of the said Convention."54 But, what normative effect these repudiations to
a reservation actually have is questionable when viewed through the choiceaccountability and cost-benefit prisms.
Reservations made to human rights conventions present two particular
challenges. First, unlike "ordinary" treaties that manage purely sovereign
relationships, human rights agreements operate simultaneously at two

I.L.M. 1391 ("Switzerland reserves the right not to recognize any parental responsibility
or measure in so far as it is incompatible with any measure taken by its authorities in
relation to the property of a child situated on its territory"); But see infra p. 11 and note
51 (noting the problem with broad jurisdictional reservations that effectively negate
enforceability).
51. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Status, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
52. See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 51, Reservation of Algeria to Art.
IX ("The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria does not consider itself bound by
article IX of the Convention, which confers on the International Court of Justice jurisdiction in all disputes relating to the said Convention").
53. See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 51, Reservation of Malaysia to
Art. IX ("That with reference to article IX of the Convention, before any dispute to
which Malaysia is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of Malaysia is required in each
case").
54. Message to the Secretary-General from the Government of Norway, Oct. 14,
1996, available at http://www.treatys.un.org/untc/Pages/View.Details.aspx?src=

TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-I&Chapter-4&lang=en.
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levels: state-to-state and state-to-individual.55 Human rights agreements
seek to articulate a universality of right that is broader in scope and depth
than the economic relationships protected by, for example, a bilateral trade
agreement. 56 As such, they can be perceived as more intrusive and threatening to the social, cultural and political interests of a state and its leaders57
and thus, if permitted, encourages states to make reservations to substantive
provisions.
The second challenge with reservations in the context of human rights
agreements drives to the issue of compatibility.58 The Vienna Convention
disallows reservations that are "incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty." 59 Even human rights agreements permitting reservations adopt
this principle. 60 But who decides what constitutes "incompatibility"? 6 Attempts to address this issue within the context of human rights agreements
have been met with little success given the overtly political nature of reservations. The Human Rights Committee's assertion that it has authority to

55. Human Rights Committee, C.C.P.R. General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocol thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant,
52nd Sess., Nov. 2, 1994, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6 1 8 (1994) [hereinafter
General Comment No. 24] ("Although treaties that are mere exchanges of obligations
between States allow them to reserve inter se application of rules of general international law, it is otherwise in human rights treaties, which are for the benefit of persons
within their jurisdiction").
56. But see, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, ch. I1, Jan. 1, 1994, 32
I.L.M. 289; See also Archer Daniels Midland Co.; Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas,
Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5. Whether the theoretical
distinction between "ordinary" and "human rights" treaties holds true today in light of
the emerging trend in trade agreements that confer individual economic rights is becoming more questionable.
57. See, e.g., Stephanie E. Berry, Bringing Muslim Minorities Within The International Convention On The Elimination Of All Forms Of Racial Discrimination- Square
Peg In A Round Hole?, 11(3) Hum. RTs. L. REV. 423 (2011).
58. See Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on DiscriminationAgainst Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281 (1991) (noting that

despite calls no one has defined what constitutes incompatibility).
59. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, at art. 19(c).
60. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 28.
61. See Brad R. Roth, Understanding the "Understanding": Federalism Constraintson Human Rights Implementation, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 891, n. 5 (2001) (noting

that notwithstanding the HRC assertion that it can judge the incompatibility of a reservation, "it is not clear who can so judge, and with what legal consequence").
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judge the compatibility of certain reservationS62 has been met with great
skepticism and outright denunciation. 63 Agreements that recognize the authority of states to declare a particular reservation incompatible often set the
thresholds so high that is it nearly impossible to achieve this result. 4 Consequently, one is left wondering what, if any, purpose a human right agreement can serve if states are allowed to make substantive reservations
without fear of aftereffect. 65

III.

CEDAW: A

CASE STUDY IN RESERVATION PROBLEMS

CEDAW, with some 187 members, is among one of the most widely
ratified human rights agreements in the world, having been adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 18, 1979. Though widely
accepted, CEDAW has received mixed reviews, in part because of the sheer
number of reservations and declarations that accompany it.66 Supporters
credit CEDAW with important victories such as the development of women's rights in Botswana and Japan, inheritance reforms in Tanzania, property rights in Costa Rica, and constitutional reform in Brazil and Uganda. 67
However, critics of CEDAW see its various shortcomings as undermining
progress towards ending gender discrimination. For example, some signatories are only nominally committed to the agreement's objective, which is to
end all forms of discrimination. 68 Other countries either fail to meet or out-

62. See General Comment 24, supra note 55, at

18 (on issues relating to reserva-

tions made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols
thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant).

63. See, e.g., Observations by the United States on General Comment 24, Letter
dated Mar. 28, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (rejecting committee's views that it has author-

ity to judge compatibility of reservations and insisting that reservations are presumptively valid unless rejected by the parties).
64. See, e.g., ICERD, supra note 4, at art. 20(2).
65. See generally Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations,
and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 531, 531 (2002) (noting that the legal conse-

quences of invalid reservations is unclear).
66. See generally, Chinkin & Gordon, supra note 26 (observing that the UK made
the largest number of reservations and declarations to CEDAW of any nation at that
point).
67. See Lesley Wexler, Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration of
Unratifiedand Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law, 28 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 1, 24 (2006) (cit-

ing Working Group on Ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Human Rights for All 6, 37 (2001)).

68. CEDAW, supra note 6, at pmbl.
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right ignore reporting requirements. 69 Others also fail to provide remedies
for individual violations. 70
To the extent CEDAW has failed to meet its objective, that failure can
be attributed to two structural shortcomings in the agreement. First, notwithstanding attempts to strengthen the enforcement mechanisms through
the adoption of the Optional Protocol,7 1 the fact remains that CEDAW's
enforcement system is weak especially when compared to the enforcement
mechanisms contained in other international agreements, 72 particularly trade
agreements. Like many human rights agreements, CEDAW relies heavily
on "transparency mechanisms" rather than a strong, binding enforcement
mechanism to "facilitate compliance."73 As such, the "enforcement" of universal rights is often left to a non-binding political process rather than to a
binding adjudicatory process most often associated with the effective enforcement of rights. 74 Enforcement systems premised substantially or exclusively on transparency mechanisms work only if states can be shamed into
compliance or placed at an economic disadvantage. States lacking the capacity to feel shame will hardly be intimidated into compliance by transparency. Moreover, while the Optional Protocol to CEDAW seeks to
improve enforcement, it enjoys less substantial membership than CEDAW
69. See generally CEDAW, Country Reports, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports.htm; Jennifer Riddle, Making CEDA W Universal: A Critique of CEDAW's Reservation Regime under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the
Reporting Process, 34 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 605 (2002).
70. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Comm'n, 36th Sess, Aug. 7-25, 2006, Commc'n No. 4/2004 (Aug. 14, 2006).
71. See CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 24.
72. Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the
Fence between Western Imperialism and UncriticalAbsolutism, 25 COLUM. Hum. RTs.
L. REV. 49, 79-82 (1993) (noting weak enforcement provisions of CEDAW); Jennifer T.
Sudduth, CEDA W's Flaws: A CriticalAnalysis of Why CEDA W is Failing to Protect a
Woman's Right to Education in Pakistan,38 J.L. & EDUC. 563, 563 (2009) (arguing
CEDAW failed to protect a woman's right to education).
73. CEDAW, supra note 6, at arts. 18, 20; see supra note 67.
74. See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory
of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (comparing and
contrasting the jurisdictions of the European Court of Human Rights and concluding
that the combined power of the institutions creates an effective "community of law");
Makau Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for DeMarginalizing Enforcement, 4 BUFF. Hum. RTs. L. REv. 211 (1998) (discussing the
weaknesses of the consensus-based approach of the Human Rights Committee and arguing that the constraints placed on UN-based enforcement mechanisms leave gaps in
enforcement which are exploited by abusive states).

2013-2014]

Human Rights Conventions and Reservations

81

itself.7 5 The Optional Protocol's internal structure gives the enforcement
mechanisms less weight than is perhaps needed to ensure effective compliance with the substantive provisions of CEDAW.76 Arguably, the weak enforcement provisions in CEDAW, though improved by the Optional
Protocol, are not unique; many multilateral human rights agreements suffer
from similar problems either through design, implementation, or the unwillingness of states to give credence to enforcement efforts.77
The second shortcoming in CEDAW is the degree to which it authorizes reservations and the number of states that have taken advantage of its
reservation provision. Reservations should be used sparingly. Yet with
CEDAW numerous states have issued reservations to several of its core
provisions. Arguably, the heart of CEDAW is contained in Article 2, which
requires signatory states to initiate a series of policy reforms including the
following: (1) embody the principle of gender equality in "national constitutions or other appropriate legislation" and "to ensure, through law and
other appropriate means, the practical realization of the principle"; (2) adopt
legislative and other measures prohibiting all discrimination against women; (3) "establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal
basis with men" and ensure that tribunals and public institutions protect
women against any act of discrimination; (4) refrain from engaging in discriminatory acts or practices and ensure that public authorities and institutions act in conformity with this obligation; (5) take measures to "eliminate
discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise";
(6) take measures to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs
and practices which are discriminatory; and (7) repeal national penal provisions that discriminate against women.78 Nevertheless, under Article 28 a
75. CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 24, at Signatures and Ratifications,
available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=
IV-8-b&chapter=4&lang=en.
76. See, e.g., CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 10 ("Each State
Party may, at the time of signature or ratification of the present Protocol or accession
thereto, declare that it does not recognize the competence of the Committee provided
for in articles 8 and 9"); see CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 24, at Ratifications
and Declarations, available at http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-8-b&chapter=4&lang=en (Bangladesh, Belize, Columbia and
Cuba have all exercised their discretion and exempted themselves from the authority
granted in articles 8 and 9).
77. See generally Eighth Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 4
Dep't State Dispatch 537, 537 (1993); see also Stanley Meisler, Jury Still out on Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal Createdby U.N.; Balkans: Slow Start, Politics and Lack of
Finances Imperil Attempt to Bring Perpetratorsof Atrocities to Justice, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 1993, at A5.
78. CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 2(a)-(g).
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state may make a reservation to the convention provided that it is not "in79
compatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention." These
two provisions taken together mean that states are at once obligated to make
the necessary reforms envisioned by CEDAW and yet, through reservations,
can exempt themselves from doing precisely that.
The list of countries that have made reservations to CEDAW is exten80
sive, with over 50 states making reservations or limiting declarations.
Some reservations are technical in nature, in effect exempting states from
8
various compliance issues because of federalism concerns, ' or due to the
extent to which a state is prepared to implement a particular feature of
CEDAW relative to a particularized right. 82 But other reservations are more
substantive in nature. For example, a large number of reservations, like that
of Argentina, relate to Article 29's dispute resolution provision,83 which
provides, in part, that:
Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present Convention which is not settled
by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to
arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbi79. CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 28.
80. States that have made reservations or limiting declarations to the CEDAW
include: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil,
China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia,

France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar, New
Zealand, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain,
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
UAE, United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Viet Nam. See Meeting of States Parties to

CEDAW, 14th meeting, June 23, 2006, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2006/2 (June 23, 2006),
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doclUNDOC/GEN/NO6/309/97/PDFNO6309
97.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter Meeting].

81. See, e.g., Meeting, supra note 80, at 8 ("Australia has a federal constitutional
system in which legislative, executive and judicial powers are shared or distributed

between the Commonwealth and the Constituent States. The implementation of the
Treaty throughout Australia will be effected by the Commonwealth State and Territory
Authorities having regard to their respective constitutional powers and arrangements
concerning their exercise").
82. See, e.g., Meeting, supra note 80, at 9 ("Austria reserves its right to apply the
provision of article 11 as far as night work of women and special protection of working

women is concerned, within the limits established by national legislation").
83. See Meeting, supra note 80, at 8 ("The Government of Argentina declares that
it does not consider itself bound by article 29, paragraph I").
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tration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the
International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.8
Article 29 further provides that a state "may at the time of signature or
ratification of the present Convention or accession thereto declare that it
does not consider itself bound by paragraph I of this article" thus other
states "shall not be bound by that paragraph with respect to any State Party
which has made such a reservation." 85
Perhaps the most troubling reservations, however, are those that are
made in reference to the obligations established in Article 2. As noted earlier, CEDAW Article 2 is the heart of the agreement setting out various core
principles and requiring signatory states to take specific policy actions
aimed at eliminating "discrimination against women in all its forms." 6 The
range of policy actions are extensive, including amending national constitutions, 87 adopting appropriate legislation,88 providing for domestic administrative and judicial enforcement of rights to non-discrimination,89 and
arguably legislating against customs and practices that promote discrimination. 90 Thus, Article 2 requires states to engage in a very robust reform
effort aimed at eliminating all gender discrimination.
Numerous states, however, have made reservations to Article 2
thereby, in effect, qualifying the degree to which they will actually engage
in the policy reforms and enforcement obligations mandated by the agreement. Algeria has stated that it will comply with Article 2 "on condition
that [it does] not conflict with the provisions of the Algerian Family
Code." 9 ' The Bahamas has declared that it "does not consider itself bound
84. CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 29(1).

85. CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 29(2).

86. CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 2 (Chapeau) ("States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and
without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women").

87. See CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 2(a).
88. See CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 2(b), (f).
89. See CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 2(c).
90. See, e.g. CEDAW, supranote 6, at art. 2(f) ("To take all appropriate measures,
including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women").
91. Meeting, supra note 80, at 7; See generally Loi no 84-11 du 9 juin 1984
portant code de Ia famille (Journal Officiel, no 24 du 12-06-1984) [Law No. 84-11 of

Family Code, June 9, 1984 (Official Gazette No. 24 of 12-06-1984)] (husbands can
divorce a wife at will; women may divorce a husband only under certain
circumstances).
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by the provisions of [A]rticle 2(a)[J" 92 The DPK 93 has declared that it "does
not consider itself bound by the provisions of paragraph (f) of [A]rticle
2[.]"94 Morocco has declared that it is not bound by Article 2 to the extent
that it (1) affects rules of succession, or (2) conflicts with Islamic sharia
law. 95 A number of signatory states have also made reservations to Articles
1196 and 16.97 The various reservations raise three important questions: (1)
when will a reservation rise to the level of "incompatibility"; (2) what is the
legal effect of objecting to a reservation made to a multilateral agreement;
and (3) who decides what "incompatibility" means. It is perhaps simpler to
take these questions in reverse order.
CEDAW Article 28 declares that "A reservation incompatible with the
98
object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted." This

obscure language has multiple implications. It may be read to mean that
some entity will determine whether to "permit" a specific reservation. Alternatively, it could be read to create an ab initio obligation on states not to
submit incompatible reservations; that is, rather than providing a negative

opportunity to object it creates a positive obligation not to submit. But since
no entity sits in judgment on reservations and no state can objectively judge
its own reservations, the compatibility of reservations under CEDAW is, in
practice, a state-to-state exercise of deference or objection. 99 This patchwork approach to dealing with reservations to CEDAW necessarily means
that the universality of its substantive provisions is distinctly non-universal
92.
93.
94.
95.

Meeting, supra note 80, at 9.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Meeting, supra note 80, at 11. See also Meeting, supra note 80, at 27 (Sing.).
See Meeting, supra note 80, at 22.

96. See Meeting, supra note 80, at 8 (Austr.), II (Austria), 15 (Ir.), 19 (Malta), 20

(Micr.), 27 (Sing.), and 31-32 (U.K.).
97. See, Meeting, supra note 80, at 7 (Aig.), 9 (Bah. & Bahr.), 11 (Egypt), 12-13
(Fr.), 14-15 (India's declaration & Iraq's reservation), 15 (Isr.), 16 (Jordan), 16-17 (Kuwait & Leb.), 17-18 (Libya), 18 (Lux.), 19 (Maldives), 19-20 (Malta), 21 (Monaco), 2425 (Niger & Oman), 26 (Rep. of Kor.), 28 (Switz. & Syria), 28-29 (Thai. & Tunis.), 3031 (UAE), 33 (U.K.).

98. CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 28(2).
99. See, e.g., Meeting, supra note 80, at 36 (Austria's Objection to UAE Reservations); see also Meeting, supra note 80, at 36-37 (Denmark's Objections to UAE Reservations) ("[T]he Government of Denmark considers the said reservations as being
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and accordingly inadmissible and without effect under international law"); Meeting, supra note 80, at 87 (Finland's Objection to Micronesia Reservations) ("[Tihe reservations made by Micronesia,
addressing some of the most essential provisions of the Convention, and aiming to
exclude the obligations under those provisions, are in contradiction with the object and
purpose of the Convention").
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and practically left to the discretion of bilateral relationships, not the multilateral regime.
Moreover, the legal effect of objecting to a substantive reservation to a
multilateral agreement is not entirely clear. On the one hand, reservations
are intended to allow states to join multilateral agreements that they otherwise could not or would not join because of particularized objections. The
right to make reservations to CEDAW is indicative of this approach. However, because under CEDAW the validity of objections to a reservation is
essentially a bilateral determination, the legal effect of objecting to a reservation on compatibility grounds is indeterminate within the multilateral system. The lack of effect is compounded by the fact that many objections to
particular reservations are themselves accompanied by qualifying language
to the effect that, notwithstanding the objection, the convention remains
effective between the two states. 00 This ultimately pays lip service to the
notion of objecting.
Finally, the term "incompatibility" is legally ambiguous. There is no
universal agreement on what constitutes incompatibility, the term being
rather fluid in application if not in definition. Generally, a legal incompatibility exists when two purposes, offices, or obligations are not susceptible
to co-existence. Such a definition would seem to foreclose the possibility of
any substantive reservations since reservations are by definition unilateral
declarations that exempt a state from one or more obligations to an international agreement. But a legal incompatibility is not simply a definitional
question; it also exists on a functional plane. Thus, the difference between
technical reservations and substantive reservations carries an important
functional distinction that should largely determine the compatibility of a
reservation with the objectives of the treaty. As such, a reservation must be
assessed not relative to a particular definition but rather relative to the functional purposes of the agreement. Technical reservations may cause
problems, but they do not necessarily conflict with the functional purpose
of the agreement or erode the overall substantive obligations of a state. And
even some particularized substantive reservations, while not ideal, can be
accommodated so long as the principal objectives and obligations of the
agreement are met.
However, broad substantive reservations such as those asserted with
respect to CEDAW Article 2 are quite different. Such reservations raise
grave questions regarding the co-existence of a legal obligation to act and a
legal objection to that very act. Since Article 2 requires states to undertake a
100. See, e.g., Meeting, supra note 80, at 40 (Lat.) ("However, this objection shall
not preclude the entry into force of the Convention between the Republic of Latvia and
the United Arab Emirates").
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broad range of policy actions to end all forms of discrimination,making a
broad reservation to this provision would appear incompatible ab initio not
only with the objective of CEDAW but with very specific legal obligations
signatory states have agreed to assume. In short, a state cannot agree to
eliminate all forms of discrimination against women while simultaneously
asserting that it will qualify its obligation to such an extent that it effectively renders the principal obligations null. One cannot make a reservation
that effectively constitutes a reservation not to act at all.
IV.

Is THERE

A SOLUTION?

Enforcing human rights agreements present particularly difficult challenges. These challenges result from the fact that (1) many agreements are
broadly worded, leading to multiple interpretations and opportunities for
exceptions, and (2) unlike economic treaties, human rights agreements cross
so many thresholds at once that they impact deeply ingrained religious, social, cultural, sovereignty, and political interests. Everyone may agree that
gender equality is important, but they do so based on distinctive domestic
experiences that inform what "equality" means relevant to the role of women in a particular society. Thus, resolving questions of "equality" is often
a derivative of cultural and emotional experiences. Moreover, human rights
agreements themselves can present normative challenges in, for example,
the conflict between cultural rights (which can impact issues of gender) and
individual rights (which can inform and conflict with culture).' 0 But is it
intellectually possible to hold two opposing positions at once - recognizing
the equality of cultural rights and individual rights? The myriad of human
rights agreements would seem to suggest that the answer is the affirmative.102 Thus, broadly worded reservations to agreements such as CEDAW
101. See, e.g., Richard Frimpong Oppong, Private InternationalLaw in Africa:
The Past, Present,And Future, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 677 (2007) (noting that the impact

of human rights law is felt in the area of internal conflict of laws as communities try to
protect the customary laws by invoking their cultural rights and individuals resist the
application of customary laws on human rights grounds); See also Philip Fennell &
Urfan Khaliq, Conflicting or Complementary Obligations? The UN Disability Rights
Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights and English Law, 6 EUR. HuM.
RTs. L. REV. 662 (2011).

102. But see, Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter- Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 125, $ 148 (June 17, 2005) (noting that cultural rights may supersede individual
property rights); see also Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Evolution Of InternationalIndigenous
Rights In The Inter-American Human Rights System, 6(2) Hum. RTs. L. REV. 281
(2006); David S. Berry, InterpretingRights And Culture: Extending Law's Empire, 4(1)
REs PUBLICA 3 (1998).
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are but forms of state accommodation that allows two seemingly opposing
positions to coexist with low probability of consequence.
In the context of CEDAW, the international community has attempted
to balance state accommodations with individual rights through the Optional Protocol. The protocol empowers the CEDAW committee to receive
individual and group complaints regarding violations and, in some circumstances, to initiate sua sponte investigations into "grave or systemic violations by a State Party[.]"10 3 But within the context of CEDAW reservations,
the Protocol suffers two infirmities. First, many of the states that have made
substantive reservations to CEDAW Article 2 have not joined the Optional
Protocol. As a result, the committee lacks authority to inquire into the actions of those states and the extent to which states have complied with their
policy reform obligations. Second, to the extent that the Optional Protocol
is available, it empowers the committee to accept individual and group
complaints. It does not authorize the committee to assess whether a reservation is incompatible. This is important. Because reservations essentially operate on a bilateral plane, no individual or group of individuals are
empowered to challenge their validity and no state is empowered to present
the question to the committee. Consequently, there is no means to answer
the legal question of whether a particular reservation is incompatible with
the objectives of the convention, and legal incompatibility is a question separate from political incompatibility. As a result of this infirmity, reservations to fundamentally substantive provisions of CEDAW go unchallenged.
How to solve the dilemma of the legal validity of substantive reservations is not only important to CEDAW but to other human rights agreements as well. Reservations may have political or cultural origins, but they
can have profound legal implications concerning state obligations under an
agreement and individual rights sought to be protected. This later consideration is of particular importance given that many human rights agreements
operate in that space between what would be considered state-to-state considerations under international law and the relationship between the state
and the individual, which has traditionally been reserved to the exclusive
authority of the state under the principle of sovereignty. Accordingly,
human rights agreements, like many emerging economic accords, technically require a surrendering of a certain amount of state sovereignty in favor
of protecting individuals from the very power of the state if they are to be
effective. Unlike many emerging economic accords, however, human rights
agreements frequently lack the broad and effective dispute resolution
processes often found in the former in which the authority of the state to
ignore its treaty obligations are more constrained. As a result, reservations
103. CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 8.
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to substantive provisions in human rights agreement can compound the ineffectiveness of such agreements given the lack of otherwise effective enforcement mechanisms coupled with the power of the state to exempt itself
from its substantive obligations. In effect, not only is a particular agreement
rendered nothing more than a tonal achievement by such state action, but
the rule of law as a mechanism for combating misdeeds and forestalling
future misconduct is also dubious.
One possible approach to resolving reservation validity is to extract the
issue from its purely political context (where it rests today) and turn it into a
truly legal question (where it needs to rest tomorrow). The Vienna Convention, CEDAW, and ICERD,"0 all recognize the potential for incompatible
reservations. However, the mechanisms available for resolving the legal
questions are overly consensus-driven or allow states to abstain from the
judicial remedies provided. 05 Combining an approach that (1) empowers
the ICJ to resolve the validity of a reservation without the requirement of
consent but (2) provides a triggering threshold through which a predetermined number of states can raise a validity question would provide a better
06
mechanism for addressing the legal issue of reservation compatibility.
And, to be clear, while the act of making a reservation is clearly an act of
political judgment its consequences are clearly legal in nature. Since reservations impact multilateral obligations, not simply domestic interests, allowing a threshold number of states to challenge a reservation before the
ICJ or establishing an automatic trigger for review based on such a threshold number of objections could dampen the politics of reservations while
104. See ICERD supra note 4, at art. 20(2) ("A reservation incompatible with the
object and purpose of this Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall a reservation the
effect of which would inhibit the operation of any of the bodies established by this
Convention be allowed").
105. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 29(2) ("Each State Party may at the

time of signature or ratification of the present Convention or accession thereto declare
that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph I of this article. The other States
Parties shall not be bound by that paragraph with respect to any State Party which has
made such a reservation"); Similar language is found in other conventions. See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families, supra note 7, at art. 92; see also Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 30(2), Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
106. See ICERD, supra note 4, at art. 20(2) ("A reservation shall be considered
incompatible or inhibitive if at least two thirds of the States Parties to this Convention
object to it"); Compare with International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/488. The problem with
the ICERD approach is that it leaves the question of incompatibility a political question
and provides no means for a judicial determination as to legal validity.
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providing a less political, more objective international forum to adjudicate
compatibility questions. This approach would provide a judicial forum for
resolving a legal question but also require that access to that forum is premised on a collective assertion that one state's particular reservation may
not be valid.
A judicial determination as to the validity of a particular reservation
may not, in practice, alter the reserving state's behavior or its willingness to
comply with its full treaty obligations. But a judicial determination is certainly more powerful than a transparency regime standing alone. A -state
may decide to ignore an ICJ determination that its reservation is incompatible and therefore null, but other nations may not be willing to ignore that
determination prompting subsequent action to encourage compliance not
only with the ICJ's judgment but, more importantly, the very substantive
obligations a state is otherwise seeking to avoid by exercising a reservation.
Such an approach would also create a body of case law concerning reservation compatibility and place states on notice that making reservations to an
agreement is a grave matter deserving of searching legal scrutiny and considerable attention, and not simply a matter of political expedience.
V.

CONCLUSION

Under international law, the status of the state gives political leaders
considerable leeway in adopting, qualifying, and abiding by international
agreements. The use of reservations, largely a development of the 20th century, has been seen as a means of accommodating peculiar state interests
while allowing states to participate in a treaty regime. This approach to
qualifying treaty obligations is particularly understandable in the context of
human rights agreements given their potential to intrude on deeply held
cultural, social, religious and political views. CEDAW evidences an attempt
to accommodate states while maintaining core principles. However, when a
state can exempt itself from the core objectives of an agreement using reservations, nothing more is achieved than appearing as one of the "club" without the obligation to be a true member of the club.
An approach to resolving this dilemma is to recognize that reservations
are not simply of political but legal significance as well. As such, the compatibility of reservations should be a legal question amenable to scrutiny
before an appropriate tribunal, not simply a political question left to bilateral relationships. If human rights conventions are to be more than window
dressings, the entire reservation process must evolve from an exclusively
political assessment by signatory states to a true legal process where the
compatibility of a reservation can be objectively assessed in a neutral forum. Addressing the validity of reservations calls for balancing sovereignty
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concerns against a state's treaty obligations and the individual rights often
recognized in human rights agreements. But the balance cannot be solely
weighted to state sovereignty concerns (which are largely political) if
human rights agreements are to have any long reaching and substantive
impact. Subjecting uncertainties regarding state reservations to searching
judicial scrutiny is one means of rebalancing the equation.

